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Abstract. The financial services sector provides an
interesting case study for the proper relationship between
government and the private sector in the area of
information security. Financial information is attractive to
thieves; the sector is pervasively and pro-actively examined
and regulated; existing federal security rules impose
specific process duties on financial institutions; financial
regulatory agencies have exercised this authority in various
ways from issuing examination guidance that have pushed
the industry toward more robust online banking security
procedures to using the industry's payment card industry
data security standard as a measure of reasonable levels of
security. This paper suggests that the legitimate roles of
government range from allowing the industry to
autonomously develop its own set of security practices to
actively encouraging the adoption of specific security
measures. However, the government should generally
refrain from enshrining specific security measures in law or
regulation since it can freeze innovation, lock in less
effective security measures, and prevent the development of
compensating controls that are less costly and equally
effective. A key role should be to assist the industry to move
to higher and socially beneficial levels of security in order to
overcome various coordination problems that prevent
natural industryforcesfrom moving in that direction.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In December 2010, the Financial Services Sector Coordinating
Council (FSSCC) signed a memorandum of understanding with the
Department of Commerce and the Department of Homeland Security.'
The purpose of this memorandum was to improve security in the
financial services industry and, in particular, to set the stage for
research and development projects that would facilitate innovation,
identify and overcome cybersecurity vulnerabilities, and develop more
effective and efficient cybersecurity processes.2 The memorandum
commits the parties to work together cooperatively in projects of
cooperation and coordination, information sharing and the
development and implementation of joint test infrastructures.3 The
three parties also pledge to cooperate with the U.S. Treasury
Department, which leads responsibility for cybersecurity in the
financial services sector.4
Why is this interesting? It helps illuminate the question of the
proper roles and responsibilities of government and industry in the
provision of reasonable information security in the financial services
industry. The memorandum of understanding provides an outline of
the best way to proceed. The key words are cooperation and
coordination, where each party recognizes its own area of expertise
and works together with others toward a common goal.
This might seem banal and too obvious to be worth discussing, but
in fact this model stands in sharp contrast to some typical thinking
about the proper role of government and industry in the provision of
important goods like information security. On the one hand, some
think that government should not be a partner with industry, but
should instead play a unilaterally dominating role, determining
through regulatory processes the direction and amount of investment
1 Memorandum of Understanding between the Dep't of Homeland Sec. Sci. and Tech.
Directory, Dep't of Commerce Nat'l Inst. of Standards and Tech., and Fin. Servs. Sector
Coordinating Council for Critical Infrastructure Protection and Homeland Sec. (Dec. 6,
2010), available at https://www.fsscc.org/fsscc/reports/2010/
FSSCCDHSNISTMOU_12o6201o.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum of Understanding].
2 Id. at 1.
3 Id. at 2.
4 Id.
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in information security in the industry.5 On the other hand, others
view the matter as totally within the discretion of industry players.
They argue that market forces will set the right level of effort to
promote information security in the industry and that the government
has no role in coordinating this effort. 6
This paper adopts the point of view that cooperation and
coordination should be the default mode of interaction between key
government agencies and the financial services industry. I illustrate
this theme through the examination of case studies. The first involves
the payment card industry data security standard (PCI DSS). I briefly
trace the development of this standard as the product of autonomous
industry initiatives. Then, I discuss the use of this standard by the
Federal Trade Commission in enforcing its requirement for
reasonable information security practices and by state legislatures and
regulators as a template for mandatory state information security
rules. The second case study involves the guidance issued by federal
financial services regulators in the area of online banking. The
regulators concluded that single factor authentication, such as static
passwords, were insufficient by themselves to defend against phishing
attacks, and recommended stronger authentication procedures,
including two-factor authentication. The third case study involves the
public-private partnership that fostered the development of smart
card technology in the European Union. I then draw lessons learned
from these case studies, which include:
* Government can have an extraordinarily
powerful effect through the establishment of
liability rules and regulatory responsibility;
* Regulation and legislation should be at the level
of principles with implementation left flexibly
to the interaction of industry and government
agencies;
5 Part II, infra, discusses the Minnesota law on payment industry data security which
prescribes as a matter of law very specific security requirements for industry to follow.
6 See Thomas P. Brown & Richard A. Epstein, Cybersecurity in the Payment Card
Industry, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 221-23 (2008) (arguing that contracts within the
industry will be able to allocate efficiently information security responsibilities without the
need for any government coordinating role).
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* Government involvement is counterproductive
when it locks specific security practices into law
or regulation;
* Government has a key role as a convener:
o It should identify and eliminate
coordination difficulties that prevent
industry action.
o These institutional roadblocks will be
less about the efficient level of security
investments and more about the
allocation of costs and benefits
associated with moving to a higher level
of security; and
* The legitimate government role ranges from low
to high involvement:
o Industry autonomously evolves security
standards.
o An enforcement role putting the weight
of government behind industry-
developed and upgraded standards.
o More active phase where government
agencies conclude that current industry
practices are inadequate and must be
improved but does not mandate or
promote any particular solution.
o A more active phase where government
actively encourages industry to adopt a
particular security approach.
Part II deals with the case studies involving the U.S. payment card
industry security standard, the regulatory response to online banking
security vulnerabilities, and the European public-private partnership
regarding smart card security. Part III draws together the lessons
learned. Part IV provides a conclusion.
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II. PART Two
A. PAYMENT CARD INDUSTRY DATA SECURITY STANDARD
All business institutions have a responsibility to keep the
information they have on data subjects secure from unauthorized
access.7 In the financial services industry, special features add to this
general obligation. First, there is a long history of confidentiality in
the industry. Customers of financial institutions have a settled
expectation that their information will be held in a confidential
fashion and, for generations, bankers and other providers of financial
institutions have met these expectations. It is built into their
traditions and institutional practices. Second, there are explicit
requirements that financial institutions face under current law.8 These
requirements are enforced in the financial services industry through
regular examinations of bank practices and processes.
Retail payment systems operated by financial institutions and
their service companies live under these obligations as well. These
payment systems include the unitary systems operated by American
Express and Discover, and the network-forming companies Visa and
MasterCard that coordinate the retail payment activities of thousands
of financial institutions.9 In these systems, network operators bring
together merchants and customers in a two-sided market. Unitary
systems do this directly by providing the ability to accept payment
instruments to merchants and the ability to use payment instruments
to retail customers. Distributed payments systems do this through
intermediary financial institutions that handle the direct relationships
with merchants and retail customers.
In both cases, the flow of information through the system is crucial
for understanding security threats and vulnerabilities. In a typical
transaction, a cardholder swipes a card at a merchant location.
7 The fair information practices adopted by HHS, OECD, FTC, DHS all include reasonable
security as a requirement. For an account of the development of fair information practices
see Fred Cate, Failure ofFair Information Practice Principles, in CONSUMER PROTECTION
IN THE AGE OF THE INFORMATION ECONOMY 342 (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006); see also Robert
Gellman, Fair Information Practices: A Basic History, BOBGELLMAN.COM (Oct. 3, 2011),
http://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPShistory.pdf.
8 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 1o6-
102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
9 See DAVID EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH PLASTIC: THE DIGITAL
REVOLUTION IN BUYING AND BORROWING (2d ed. 2006).
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Information needed to authenticate the transaction is read off the
magnetic stripe of the card by the terminal at the point of sale. This
information is transmitted through communications networks and
computer systems operated by the payment company. In distributed
systems, the information is first routed to the merchant's bank, then
via the payment card network to the cardholder's bank. The card
number functions as routing information directing the authentication
information to the right financial institutions. At the financial
institution, the security code embedded in the magnetic stripe
functions as an access code. If the code is incorrect or missing, the
financial institution can decline the transaction. If the code is correct,
and the cardholder's account can support the transaction, the
financial institution sends a return message authorizing the
transaction. The account number and the security codes are the
crucial pieces of information that must be protected by information
security systems at each stage of the process--from merchant location
to the cardholder's financial institution.
The demand for information security cascades through the layers
of the retail payment industry. Distributed payment systems, such as
Visa and MasterCard compete with each other for the loyalty and
business of financial institutions, and the integrity and security of
financial transactions is an essential element of this competition. In
turn, financial institutions and unitary payments such as American
Express compete for merchant and individual customer business and
must provide assurances of merchant security and cardholder
information in order to acquire and retain customers in this intensely
competitive market.
A third legal element unique to the payment industry reinforces
these general pressures toward providing information security. The
liability for security breaches that lead to fraud losses typically falls on
the financial institutions themselves.1o Financial institutions that issue
payment cards cannot pass the losses associated with unauthorized
use of these cards on to the cardholders. They have a clear economic
incentive to reduce the security vulnerabilities that can lead to fraud
losses. Within the retail payment industry, therefore, existing
traditions, industry practices, explicit legal requirements, and liability
allocation all move the industry toward higher levels of information
security.
10 The Truth in Lending Act protects consumers from liability for charges resulting from
the unauthorized use of their credit cards. See Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 16oi-1666
(2010). The Electronic Fund Transfer Act provides, among other things, consumer
protections for the use of debit cards. See 15 U.S.C. § 1693 et seq. (2010).
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However, this is not the case with other participants in retail
payment service networks. In particular, the payment processors and
merchants who are essential links and end points in these networks
are not subject to these pressures to the same degree as the financial
institutions. For them, a classic economic externality problem lessens
their incentive to make cost-effective information security
investments. "i A payment processor, for example, retains large
amounts of cardholder information as part of its network
responsibilities to transmit, store, and process transaction
information. But if hackers gain unauthorized access to cardholder
information stored in, or in transit through, the payment processor's
systems, payment processors bear no financial liability for any
resulting fraudulent activity. This liability is externalized to other
parties in the system; primarily the financial institutions who issued
the affected cards. A disclosure requirement cannot remedy this
externality since these processors typically have no retail customers
who might withdraw their business because of information security
failures.12
The payment card industry data security standard came into
existence to remedy this externality. 13 Starting with separate
initiatives by Visa and MasterCard in the early 2000S, the standards
were eventually harmonized in 2004 and handed over to a separate
payment card industry council in 2006. This council, the Payment
Card Industry Security Standards Council, now directs the
developments and upgrades for the standard, regularly issuing
bulletins about the latest security threats, authorizing security
assessors, and publishing new versions of the standard. 14
"iFor the classic statement connecting information security issues to economic
externalities, see Ross Anderson & Tyler Moore, The Economics ofInformation Security,
314 SCI. 61o, 610-13 (2006).
12 In a typical case, the customers of these processors are merchants or banks that provide
payment service to banks who themselves have no liability in the case of data breaches
resulting in fraud.
13 For more detail on this development see Mark MacCarthy, Information Security Policy
in the U.S. Retail Payments Industry, 2011 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 3 (2011).
14 About Us, PCI SECURITY STANDARDS COUNCIL, https://ww w.pcisecuritystandards.org/
organization info/index.php (last visited Feb. 27, 2012). The latest version of the standard,
issued in October 2010, is PCI DSS version 2.0. See PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL,




The standard consists of the following three elements: (1) a list of
required activities and security measures organized around twelve
general security rules; (2) a mandate of validation of compliance with
the standard; (3) and enforcement actions taken for failure to comply.
The requirements consist of detailed measures to be taken by all
entities that store, process or transmit cardholder data. The standard
contains rules designed to meet threats and vulnerabilities typically
encountered in the payment card environment and specific enough for
an independent security assessor to validate compliance. For example,
the general rule to protect stored data is made more specific for the
payment card environment by the detailed requirement not to store
payment card security codes. The storage of these security codes
serves no legitimate business purpose and creates the possibility that
compromised information could be used to make counterfeit cards.
Compliance with PCI DSS is achieved through private contract.
The payment card networks, for example, have a network of contracts
with financial institutions that provide services to merchants. These
contracts require the financial institutions to ensure that the
merchants they service are in compliance with the standard. The
validation requirement is also enforced through contract. Each
financial institution is required to ensure that its merchant customers
provide a report on compliance to them each year. Merchants of a
certain size must have a security assessment done by an independent
outside vendor. Penalties for failure to comply can include fines and,
in extreme cases, a ban on processing transactions.
Success of the program is a matter of dispute. Compliance rates
have increased since the start of the program, with large merchants
approaching 90% domestically and over three quarters globally.5 But
15 Maria Bruno-Britz, PCI Council and Visa See More PCI Compliance, BANK SYs. & TECH.,
Dec. 21, 20o8, http://ww w.banktech.com/payments-cards/204802100 (noting that
"compliance definitely is trending upward, certainly among large and midsize merchants.
Figures recently released from Visa (San Francisco) show that 65 percent of the largest
merchants have validated their compliance to the PCI DSS, up from 36 percent in
December 2006. Midsize merchants are complying, too, with 43 percent now in
compliance compared with just 15 percent at the end of 2006."); Ellen Richey, Statement at
the Visa Security Summit (March 19, 2009) (transcript available at the VISA NEWSROOM,
http://corporate.visa.com/-media/ellen-richey-summit-remarks.pdf) (By 2009,
compliance among large merchant compliance had grown to 90% with almost 100%
compliance with the prohibition on storage of security codes.); see also Press Release, Visa,
Visa Program Encourages Merchant Adoption of EMV Chip as Path Toward Dynamic
Authentication (Feb. 9, 2011), available at http://corporate.isa.com/media-center/press-
releases/pressio98jsp (International compliance is high as well. According to Visa, "More
than 76 percent of the world's largest retailers have validated compliance with the security
standard."). Even the level of compliance, though, is not free of controversy. Some studies
report that two-thirds of the companies that should be in full compliance with PCI are not.
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the effectiveness of the program in stopping data breaches is
controversial. Visa maintains that ". . . no compromised entity has yet
been found to be in compliance with PCI DSS at the time of a
breach." 6 The perception that the standard is ineffective stems from
the fact that some companies that suffered a breach had validated
compliance with PCI. However, forensic analysis of the compromised
systems showed that they were not in compliance at the time of the
breach.17 This difference between validating compliance and being in
compliance does not indicate an underlying weakness in the standard
itself. It might reflect difficulties in the assessment process, which
often rely on sample testing of systems and can fail to detect
vulnerabilities.
The point of this development for present purposes is that the
standard was formulated and diffused through the industry without a
government mandate. No government entity dictated the content of
the standard or mandated any element of it as the standard was being
developed. The industry's reaction to the vulnerabilities at the edges of
the payment networks was self-contained and autonomous. This
might seem to vindicate those who think that the government should
simply stay out of the business of promoting information security in
the industry. But that would be a misleading interpretation of the
events because it ignores the crucial role played by the Federal Trade
Commission in promoting compliance with the industry standard.
A. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ENFORCEMENT
Since 2001, the Federal Trade Commission has brought over
twenty-nine cases alleging that businesses had failed to protect
consumer information.18 More significantly, since 2005, they have
See Matthew J. Schwartz, 67% of Companies Fail Credit Card Security Compliance, INFO.
WEEK, (April 20, 2011, 1:o6 PM), http://informationweek.com/news/
security/management/2294o1946?queryText= credit+card+compliance.
16 Richey, supra note 15, at 3.
17 Thorough forensic examination of the state of a system at the time of a breach can reveal
vulnerabilities that might have been missed in an annual assessment. An assessment is a
snapshot, meaning that a system that is actually compliant at the time of an assessment
might fall out of compliance later. "[I]t was the lack of ongoing vigilance in maintaining
compliance that left the company vulnerable to attack. Based on our findings following the
compromise, Visa has taken the necessary step of removing Heartland from its online list
of PCI DSS compliant service providers." Richey, supra note 15, at 1.
i8 See Prepared Statement of the FTC on Consumer Privacy: Hearing on Consumer
Online Privacy Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 111th Cong. 10-11
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brought successful cases alleging that failure to maintain reasonable
security is an unfair practice under the section 5 of the FTC Act.19 In
the BJ's Wholesale case, for example, they alleged:
Respondent's failure to employ reasonable and
appropriate security measures to protect personal
information and files caused or is likely to cause
substantial injury to consumers that is not offset by
countervailing benefits to consumers or competition
and is not reasonably avoidable by consumers. This
practice was an unfair act or practice.20
From our perspective, the important point behind these unfairness
cases is that the industry standard was effectively being used as a
standard of "reasonable and appropriate security measures." The
specific allegations in the FTC's complaints map onto the
requirements of the PCI standard in ways that make it clear that the
FTC was relying on the industry standard. For example, in the BJ's
Wholesale case, the company was alleged to have "created
unnecessary risks to the information by storing it for up to thirty days
when it no longer had a business need to keep the information, and in
violation of bank rules."21 This alleged violation is the same as the
prohibition on storing cardholder security codes contained in the PCI
standard.22
As a result of these cases, the legal community began to advise its
clients that failure to comply with the industry standard could result
in a finding of unfairness by the Federal Trade Commission. It is hard
to avoid the conclusion that the improvement in compliance with the
PCI standard that took place between 2006 and 2010 was due in part
to the strong enforcement efforts of the FTC during the same period.
(2010) (prepared statement of Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=111 senate hearings&docid= f:67686.pdf.
19 Id.
20In re BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., No. 042-3160, at 3 (F.T.C. Sept. 20, 2005), available at
http://ww w.ftc.gov/os/caselist/o42316o/o923o5compo42316o.pdf.
21Id. at 2.
22 See PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, PAYMENT CARD INDUSTRY (PCI) DATA SECURITY
STANDARDS, supra note 14, at 30.
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Without this government enforcement role, it is unlikely that
compliance would have been as widespread or as swift.
This use of the FTC's enforcement power as a regulatory backup to
a standard developed autonomously by the industry is a good example
of the coordination and cooperation needed to move the industry to a
higher level of security practice. The FTC staff does not have expertise
in information security measures, but it can rely on the standard
developed by the industry in determining whether a company behaved
reasonably with respect to its security practices. This division of labor
is efficient. It allows industry experts to do what they do best, namely
to develop the standard of basic security practices. And it allows the
control over improvements in security measures to rest with these
industry experts. Enforcement follows industry-developed standards,
rather than resting on static security requirements that are enshrined
in statute or regulation.
Massachusetts has developed a way to rely on PCI DSS that is
similar to the FTC's enforcement method. In its settlement with the
Blair Group, it requires the company to maintain compliance with PCI
DSS "or such compliance standards as may be from time to time
recognized by the payment card industry as acceptable." 23 The
difference between this recognition of the evolving nature of security
standards and the static mandate contained in the Minnesota statute
considered next could not be more stark.
A. STATE MANDATES
In contrast, the mandates such as the one embodied in a
Minnesota statute are inefficient attempts to lock in current security
practices into law. Minnesota's statute codifies the PCI requirement
that security codes not be stored.24 As discussed above, this element in
the PCI standard is an important step in preventing the use of
compromised information for the production of counterfeit payment
cards. The security code is transmitted in a normal electronic request
by a retail merchant for transaction authorization. If the code is
23 Mass. v. Briar Group, LLC, Civ. No. 11-1185B, at 4, Consent Judgment (Mass. Sup. Ct.
Mar. 28, 2011).
24 Minn. Stat. § 325E.64(2) (2010). The statute is remarkably specific: "No person or entity
conducting business in Minnesota that accepts an access device in connection with a
transaction shall retain the card security code data, the PIN verification code number, or
the full contents of any track of magnetic stripe data, subsequent to the authorization of the
transaction or in the case of a PIN debit transaction, subsequent to 48 hours after
authorization of the transaction."
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missing or is the wrong code, this alerts the issuing bank to a problem
and enables it to decline the transaction.
So why not just codify it? Part of the answer is that security
standards are constantly evolving and what seems to be necessary
today might be ineffective or counterproductive tomorrow. Industry
experts are in a superior position to ensure that these standards keep
up with changes in technology and the marketplace. Once those
changes take place, a law such as the Minnesota statute creates a
potential conflict between state law and the industry's best estimate of
good security practices.25
Other dangers are more subtle and long-term. Once an element
has become law, people tend to design systems around those
requirements and do nothing else. But storage of security codes is only
one danger. These codes can also be captured in transit, and other
elements of the PCI standard speak to that danger. And the industry is
looking at other measures such as encryption of data in transit to deal
with that vulnerability. By codifying one element of industry practices
but not others that currently exist or that might be developed, the law
might be counterproductive by focusing efforts in some areas but
sending the message that other measures are less important.
Moreover, if the state has mandated the use of one method, efforts
to innovate to use different, but more effective methods are
discouraged. Why spend the research and development resources to
seek out and develop something new and better if the state would
continue to require the older, less effective security measure? A
similar point can be made about cost-effectiveness. If a new security
measure accomplishes the same result at a fraction of the cost, why
not use it and free up the resources saved for more productive uses?
But the state mandate destroys the incentive for research and
experimentation on more cost-effective security measures, since the
old, more expensive approach would be required regardless.
These harmful effects are magnified by an aspect of the Minnesota
statute that creates a new cause of action for entities harmed
financially by a data breach. This cause of action is created when the
entity whose system has been compromised has stored security codes
in violation of the state's new security standard. 26 The beneficiaries of
25 Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger used this argument in vetoing Assembly Bill 779, a
California bill that would impose a security requirement similar to the Minnesota statute.
See Letter from Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of California, to Members of the
California State Assembly (Oct. 13, 2007), available at
http://gov.ca.gov/pdf/press/2007bills/AB%20779%2oVeto%2oMessage.pdf.
26 Minn. Stat. § 325E.64(3) (2010).
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this system are intended to be the financial institutions who, in
reaction to a data compromise, expend resources to mitigate the
harms that might result from the breach.27 These actions typically
include sending notification letters to their account holders, putting
accounts on a watch list, canceling and re-issuing cards, and the losses
resulting from fraudulent uses of the card. The idea is that financial
institutions will be able to recover reasonable costs associated with
these efforts from the merchants who have suffered a breach and have
improperly stored security codes.
The industry has undertaken a process of allowing this kind of cost
recovery. Under the older industry liability allocation rules, when a
data breach occurred and fraud resulted, the liability for fraud losses
and other expenses associated with the breach fell on the financial
institution issuing the card. Other players were insulated. The
cardholders themselves typically faced zero liability. The merchants
where the fraud took place were normally paid in full and the banks
provided service to these merchants, even though the transaction was
not authorized by the actual cardholder.28
Most importantly, the merchants and processors where the data
breach occurred, and the banks servicing them, were not held liable
for the damages associated with the breach. As noted above, this
created inefficiency and a disincentive to expend resources to keep
cardholder information safe and secure. PCI was an attempt to
remedy this inefficient alignment of incentives, by requiring
compliance with industry standards as a contractual condition of
being part of the payment system.
An additional effort on the part of the payment industry to correct
this misalignment of incentives is to adopt an internal cost-recovery
program. Under these programs, financial institutions that have been
harmed by a data breach can use internal payment system process to
recover some of the costs associated with the breach. The idea is to
create a more balanced incentive structure, whereby merchants and
processors who do not comply with industry security rules and cause
harm to other payment system participants face financial
consequences of their failure to follow good security practices. It is
27 Id.
28 The exception was for online merchants where, for a variety of reasons, liability for
unauthorized use generally rested with the online merchant.
[Vol. 8.2254
1MACCARTHY
one way to move the industry to a higher level of compliance with PCI
DSS.29
In contrast, legislated cost recovery programs are
counterproductive. The control over the program shifts from private
parties governed by their contractual obligations to the court system.
Instead of rapid compensation for harms, the court process could
simply create gridlock. Financial institutions could bring a case
against a merchant firm who had suffered a breach alleging that it had
improperly stored cardholder security codes. But the merchant could
reasonably demand that the complainant prove to the court that it was
responsible. The chain of causality between the alleged breach and the
alleged harm has so many vulnerable links that this process could be
easily extended indefinitely.
Consider the kinds of questions that could be asked. Was there
really a breach? Forensic evidence is not always conclusive. If there
was a breach, was it in the system under the control of the merchant,
or did it occur at a different point in the transmission and storage of
transaction information, perhaps at one of the upstream processors?
If the breach was really in their systems, were they really storing
security codes or did the hackers gain access to that information in
transit? If they really were storing the security code and there really
was a breach, was there any harm to the plaintiff from this breach?
Often cardholder information is subject to multiple breaches and so it
is a complex task to associate the harm with one breach with another
breach or some other cause.
The steps that financial institutions can take to respond to a
notification of a breach are within the discretion of the financial
institution. Not all card numbers compromised in an alleged breach
are actually used for fraudulent purposes. As a result, large financial
institutions with substantial security and risk management
departments and budgets can typically put the affected card numbers
29 In the Visa system, this cost recovery program started in 2006 and was expanded in
2007. See Press Release, Visa, Visa Expands Fraud Recovery For Card Issuers (May 27,
2008), available at http://corporate.isa.com/media-center/press-releases/press78o.jsp.
Visa has also negotiated cost recovery settlements with breached entities that compensate
to some degree the financial institution affected by a breach. See Press Release, Visa, Visa
and TJX Agree to Provide U.S. Issuers up to $40.9 Million for Data Breach Claims: U.S.
Visa Issuers Eligible to Participate in Speedy, Alternative Recovery Program (Nov. 30,
2007), available at http://corporate.visa.com/media-center/press-releases/press748.jsp.
In addition, there are financial penalties that can be assessed when a breached entity is out
of compliance with PCI DSS. See Cardholder Information Security Program, VISA.CoM,
http://usa.visa.com/merchants/risk management/cisp-overview.html (last visited
Dec.12, 2011).
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on a special watch list and see if there is any incremental fraud above
the background rate. Smaller financial institutions, typically
community banks and credit unions, usually react to a breach notice
by immediately re-issuing cards. Is that a reasonable attempt to
mitigate the possible damage from a breach? Once in a court context,
there would need to be a court judgment about which financial
institution responses were reasonable and which were excessively
cautious. Financial institutions, thinking that they could recover all
their costs from breached entities, might spend more than was
necessary to protect their customers, and find themselves unable to
recover these unnecessary costs in court.
All of these judgments would be referred to courts for decision. If
other states imitate Minnesota then different courts might reach
different decisions based on the details of the state level security
standards imposed. Merchants in different states would face different
standards of due care and financial institutions in different states
would face different interpretations of their obligations to protect
their consumers. These problems could be addressed through national
legislation, but then federal courts would become the de facto
interpreter of security requirements and duties of due care to financial
consumers.
Merely listing these possible difficulties suggests that moving the
questions of the right level of security to statute and to the court
system is not likely to improve the level of security in the industry.
Instead, it seems likely to result in interminable legal wrangles and to
a work-to-rule mentality in the industry that could block further
progress. 30 The problems are exacerbated when the prospect of
litigation is used as an enforcement mechanism for a specific codified
security standard. Companies facing limited resources for security
investments will move to limit litigation risk by complying with just
the elements called for by the statute.
A. ONLINE BANKING SECURITY
30 These issues can of course arise in the private sector cost recovery programs operated by
the payment networks, but they are less likely to result in gridlock. The goal of these
programs is not to have aggrieved parties trying to extract the maximum amount from
defendants in a legal proceeding, but to do rough justice that balances the interests of
different parties in the same private payment system. Parties dissatisfied with the results
can always pursue their rights in court. The success of these private sector cost recovery
efforts is indicated by the fact that the overwhelming majority of financial institutions
offered a settlement in the TJX case, accepted it and abandoned their efforts to recover
costs through the court system. See Press release, Visa and TJX Agree, supra note 29.
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There is an additional role for government when there is a
widespread lapse in industry security practices that is exposing the
industry collectively to harm. This occurs in the case of password-
based single-factor authentication and phishing. When phishing
attacks against financial institutions began to increase in number and
sophistication in the early 2000s, an obvious security improvement
was to introduce two-factor authentication. Phishing attacks were
successful in part because customers were duped into revealing
information at fake financial services sites that fraudsters could then
use to gain access to financial accounts. For instance, when a
customer divulges a password at a bogus financial services website,
hackers can then use that information to gain access to his account at
the real financial services website.
Two-factor authentication tries to avoid this problem by requiring
that the customer have an additional factor - typically something the
customer has in his possession - in addition to a password. This token
generates a constantly changing password that is synchronized with
the legitimate bank's website.
This security measure is by no means perfect. It is still vulnerable
to "man in the middle" attacks. But it is clearly an improvement over
the use of static passwords. The industry expenditures in moving
toward this new system would be repaid by more than compensating
reductions in fraud losses. In a market free of imperfections, industry
participants would move toward this more efficient level of security.
In 2003, however, the industry was stuck and unable to move
toward this new technology. The problem was that excessive security
measures would increase customer dissatisfaction. The customer
would be required to carry with him or have available a security token
for each of his financial accounts. This customer inconvenience would
make it likely that the first bank to impose a security requirement
calling for an extra process and token would begin to lose customers
to those banks who did not have this requirement. No one wanted to
go first, and the industry was stuck in a situation of inadequate
security with no market incentive to move from this inefficient
position.
Financial regulators took action. They updated guidance for
financial institutions related to authentication for online banking to
require stronger authentication when high risk transactions are
present. 31 The agencies could have simply mandated two-factor
31 see FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, AUTHENTICATION IN AN INTERNET BANKING
ENVIRONMENT (2005), available at
http://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/authentication-guidance.pdf
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authentication, with all the consumer inconvenience that would entail,
and they did consider that alternative during the proposal stage of the
process. But the final rule did not mandate two-factor authentication.
Its conclusion was the more modest one; that passwords alone were
no longer an adequate authentication strategy for online banking.
Two-factor authentication or other compensating controls should be
used in risky situations when transactions involve access to customer
information or the movement of funds.32
This balanced approach allowed the industry to move from its
inefficient equilibrium. Some institutions moved toward genuine two-
factor authentication involving tokens. But others introduced other
controls. A common one is the use of pictures and other identifying
information that indicate to the customers that they are at the genuine
financial institution's website. If they do not see this identifying
symbol, they know that they are not at the right website and will
refuse to divulge access information.
Other control mechanisms included the use of device
authentication technologies that recognize the computer or other
similar devices that customers are using to access the account. When
an unfamiliar device attempts to access the account, the financial
institution prompts for answers to a series of pre-arranged security
questions. Even if the hacker has been able to obtain static password
information from the customer, they would be unlikely to have this
additional information as well. The use of additional security
questions often takes place when customers are attempting to move
funds through bill paying mechanisms or funds transfer to other
accounts.
Other elements are clearly necessary to respond to the threat of
phishing attacks. One is consumer education. Financial institutions
regularly advise their customers that they will not ask for access
information in a transaction that they initiate. This alerts customers
that if they did not initiate a transaction, they should not divulge
access information.
Measures to take down phishing sites are also important. The
industry has cooperated with ISPs, webhosts, system administrators,
domain name registrars and other Internet intermediaries to identify
32 In 2006, FFIEC acknowledged that two-factor authentication was not required as long as
some other method was used in addition to single factor authentication. BD. OF GOVERNORS
OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. ET AL., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON FFIEC GUIDANCE ON




and take down suspected phishing sites rapidly. 33 Take down is
accomplished in this context quickly and without any legal
compulsion to do so. The weakness of the process appears to be the
rapid rate of reappearance. 34
The regulators had an effect on the industry not by mandating a
particular technological response to the phishing problem, but by
concluding that the industry's static single password authentication
system was inadequate. The mandate to use multifactor
authentication would have locked the industry into a particular type of
technology and would have failed to allow the flexibility to tailor the
security response to the nature of the risk and the extent of the
possible financial harm. The conclusion that the status quo was
unacceptable, on the other hand, forced the industry to innovate to
meet the challenges of new regulatory expectations. Because the new
guidance would be enforced through the examination process,
financial institutions had to move beyond the inefficient status quo
that had them unwilling to make security innovations for fear of losing
customers. Because all of them were required to upgrade, the threat of
customer migration to other financial institutions was mitigated. In
effect, government had done what government does best: provide a
coordinating mechanism to overcome a collective action problem.
In June 2011, FFIEC released a supplement 35 to its earlier
guidance. In this supplement the FFIEC recommends that banks
"offer" multifactor authentication to their business customers. This is
a step beyond their previous view that two-factor authentication was
not required when some other method of risk mitigation was used to
supplement single-factor authentication. Notice that this
recommendation does not encourage banks to require that their
customers use multifactor authentication. But it is a clear
strengthening of their earlier guidance and could be part of an
evolution to a multifactor authentication requirement.
A. EUROPEAN SMART CARD PARTNERSHIP
33 See Tyler Moore & Richard Clayton, The Impact ofIncentives on Notice and Take-down,
in MANAGING INFORMATION RISKS AND THE ECONOMICS OF SECURITY 199 (M. Eric Johnson
ed., 2010).
34 Id.
35 see FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, SUPPLEMENT TO AUTHENTICATION IN
INTERNET BANKING (2011), available at http://images.avisian.com/Auth-ITS-Final 6-22-
11_FFIECFormated.pdf.
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Sometimes government can take a stronger role than merely
concluding that the current level and direction of security controls are
insufficient. They can, in addition, play the role of convener to nudge
the industry along the path to a specific set of security controls or
system architecture. This can happen when there is widespread
agreement that the new controls or system architecture would be an
improvement, but a government role can help to clear away
institutional impediments. The example of the European transition to
smart cards illustrates this type of government involvement.
Some background on chip and PIN (person identification number)
technologies will help to set the stage for this discussion. The PIN part
of the smart card security system is the requirement by the cardholder
to input a PIN number as part of the authentication process. PIN-
based debit cards, widely in use in the United States as access devices
for ATM machines, illustrate this aspect of smart card security.
Smart cards systems also include a microprocessor to generate
encrypted information and a point-of-sale terminal capable of
generating and receiving this information. In a standard
implementation, the point-of-sale terminal communicates with the
payment card and the card generates an authentication code using a
formula that enables the point-of-sale terminal, or host system at the
issuing bank, to ascertain whether the code is the expected one.
During the next transaction, a different authentication code is
generated. 36 As a result, thieves who obtain stored cardholder
information or information in transit are not able to use that
information to engage in a new chip transaction or to manufacture
counterfeit chip cards.
Objections to chip and PIN use have been made. Some argue that
they are not secure and evidence of vulnerabilities has been produced.
In addition, the liability shift associated with the move to chip and
PIN has been criticized as unfair to cardholders who are now liable for
unauthorized transactions that used to be the responsibility of
financial institutions.
Whatever their validity, these objections relate to the PIN part of
chip and PIN, and not to the chip part. The security vulnerabilities
alleged have to do with the ability of hackers to complete chip and PIN
36 This technology is used in the United States in the contactless payment card
implementation by Visa, MasterCard, and American Express to ensure that the
authentication code transmitted wirelessly from the contactless card to the point-of-sale
reader is different every time. As a result, even if it is intercepted, the cardholder
information that is transmitted cannot be used to perform another contactless transaction
or to create a counterfeit card.
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transactions without knowing the PIN. Using a "man in the middle"
attack researchers at Cambridge University were able to complete a
valid transaction without entering the PIN.37 This suggests that a PIN
is not sufficient to protect against the use of a stolen card.
These alleged PIN vulnerabilities also suggest that cardholders
should not be held liable for these unauthorized transactions. Banks in
areas where chip and PIN have been implemented have not changed
the basic standard of liability for unauthorized use. The current
version of the banking code in the United Kingdom has a section on
unauthorized use, which seems to preserve the immunity of
cardholders from liability. 38 It appears to limit the liability of
cardholders for unauthorized use to £50 "unless the subscriber (the
financial institution) can show that the customer acted fraudulently or
with gross negligence."39
The problem is that banks are able to hold cardholders liable if
they determine that there was gross negligence on the part of the
cardholder, and critics have charged that banks have uniformly
assumed gross negligence whenever fraud involving a PIN takes
place.4o But if "man in the middle attacks" that allow the use of the
card without the PIN are frequent enough, then this uniform
assumption of gross negligence on the part of the cardholder is no
longer justified.
One advantage of a chip card, however, has nothing to do with the
use of the PIN to prevent the use of stolen cards. As Visa's Ellen
Richey says,
Visa has repeatedly underscored the need for
authentication solutions to move to dynamic data
technologies such as EMV chip . ... [W]e believe the
future of security lies in dynamic data. Our experience
37 Steven J. Murdoch et al., Chip and PIN is Broken, 2010 IEEE SYMP. ON SEC. AND PRIVACY
433, 436 (2010), available at
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/security/banking/nopin/oaklandiochipbroken.pdf
38 LENDING STANDARD BD., THE LENDING CODE 16 (2009), available at
http://www.lendingstandardsboard.org.uk/docs/lendingcode.pdf.
39 Id.
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suggests that as markets move to chip they become less
vulnerable to counterfeit fraud and, ultimately, to mass
data compromise attacks.41
The key advantage of chip cards is that they generate dynamic
authentication information. If the information used to complete one
transaction is compromised, it cannot be used for another transaction.
Each transaction needs new authentication information. As a result,
the incentive to steal transaction information from storage or in
transit evaporates. Even if the attack is successful, the information
acquired is not useful for committing fraud.
This advantage of chip has nothing to do with the use of a PIN, so
a demonstration that the use of a PIN is ineffective against stolen card
fraud, even if valid, establishes nothing about its utility to prevent
unauthorized use related to data compromises.
It is possible to take advantage of the chip feature of smart cards to
reduce counterfeit fraud even if there is no PIN feature to reduce the
incidence of stolen card fraud. Indeed, this is the case for the
contactless chip cards introduced in the United States by Visa,
MasterCard and American Express. They have dynamic data for
authentication purposes, but do not require the use of a PIN. If
someone steals a US-issued contactless card, it can be used for other
transactions without the introduction of a PIN. Indeed, the use of a
PIN with a contactless card would make them less easy to use and less
convenient for consumers than current magnetic stripe cards. It would
also not allow the increase in throughput at the cash register which is
the major advantage of contactless cards for merchants.
So how did smart cards come to be widespread in Europe while
they do not exist in large numbers in the United States? The answer
lies in a private-public collaboration that managed the transition
from magnetic stripe cards to smart cards.
In the late 1990s, the European banking regulators, European
Commission officials and the banking industry together began to
move toward the implementation of chip and PIN. In 2001, the
European Commission issued an action plan, calling for the
introduction of chip cards:
The Fraud Prevention Action Plan has at its heart close
cooperation between the relevant public authorities
41 Press Release, Visa, Visa Program Encourages Merchant Adoption of AMV Chip as Path




and private parties, exchange of experience and
information, training, development and sharing of
educational material. Prevention is primarily a task of
the payment systems industry (payment schemes,
issuers, acquirers and manufacturers of payment
instruments). The most important improvements are
technical enhancements e.g. the introduction of chip
cards. However, the Action Plan covers preventive
measures that are most effective if implemented in
partnership with all parties concerned e.g. holders of
payment instruments, retailers and infrastructure
network providers, national and international
authorities, including law enforcement agencies.42
The Commission noted with favor the commitment of Visa and
Europay/MasterCard to complete the transition to chip and PIN
technology in the European Union by 2005.43
In 2004, the Commission issued a further action plan. 44 It
reported a decline in the growth of card fraud from 50% per year in
2000 to 15-20% in 2004, attributable to the increased efforts of the
payment industry and national authorities in implementing fraud
reduction measures. 45 The 2004 plan continued its emphasis on chip
and PIN:
The migration to chip cards in the EU within a
reasonable timeframe would increase security, help
reduce fraud and boost user confidence. It is a priority
which requires concerted efforts by all stakeholders.
42 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the
European Central Bank, the Economic and Social Committee and Europol, Preventing
Fraud and Counterfeiting ofNon-cash Means ofPayment, at 3, COM (2001) 11 final (Feb.
9, 2001), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriSery.do?uri= COM:2001:ooll:FIN:EN:PDF.
43 Id. at 5, 1o n.11.
44 Communicationfrom the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the
European Economic and Social Committee, the European Central Bank and Europol, A
New EUAction Plan 2004-2007 to Prevent Fraud on Non-cash Means ofPayment, COM
(2004) 679 final (Oct. 20, 2004), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriSery.do?uri= COM:2004:o679:FIN:EN:PDF.
45 Id. at 3 n.5.
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The Commission and national authorities should be
prepared to assist the migration to chip cards in the
EU, if necessary.46
This move to chip and PIN was a combined effort of national
authorities and payment systems. The 2004 plan was drafted in
consultation with the EU Fraud Prevention Expert Group (FPEG) of
the European Payment Council. 47 FPEG includes "EU payment
schemes, banks, national Ministries and Central Banks, law
enforcement agencies (including Europol and Interpol), the European
Central Bank, retailers, consumer groups and network operators."48
The move to chip and PIN was also part of the movement to set up
a European payment area. In its first report the EC said: "The SEPA
Card Framework (SCF) supports EMV as the technical norm because
of the higher security level it offers through the use of chip and PIN."49
In its second progress report, the EC was even firmer:
The EPC SEPA Cards Framework (SCF) supports EMV
as the technical norm because of the higher security
level it offers through the use of chip (in combination
with a PIN) instead of magnetic stripe. Therefore, SCF
compliant cards, POS terminals (point-of sales) and
ATMs (automated teller machines) will have to migrate
to EMV by end of 2010.50
To assist the movement toward chip and PIN, and because of the
increased security offered by the EMV technology, the payment
networks in Europe introduced a liability shift. This provided an
incentive to move all terminals and all cards toward compliance with
chip and PIN. The liability for fraudulent transactions passed to the
46 Id. at 5.
47 Id. at 3.
48 Id- at 4 n.8.
49 Annual Progress Report on the State of SEPA Migration in 2008, at 15 (2008)
[hereinafter State ofSEPA Migration], available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal market/
payinents/docs/sepa/progress-report 2008_en.pdf.
50 Second Annual Progress Report on the State of SEPA Migration in 2009, at 1o (Nov. 9,




party that is not EMV-compliant in the case of lost, stolen, or
counterfeit cards.51 While not mandated by public authorities, this
liability shift had the tacit support of public authorities as an effective
method of achieving the goal of transitioning to a chip and PIN
system.
The concerted effort was successful. Europe moved to the new
liability regime on January 1, 2005.52 So did the United Kingdom.53 In
2008, 62% of cards issued in the European Union were compliant,
68% of point-of-sale terminals were compliant, and 83% of automated
teller machines were compliant.54 By the end of the second quarter of
2009, those numbers had increased perceptibly. Compliance for cards
stood at 72%, 77% for point-of-sale terminals, and 93% for automated
teller machines.=5
It is reasonable to wonder whether the same public-private
partnership could work in the United States. It might not. The
relationship between government and business is more adversarial in
the United States than in other countries. Financial regulators have
had, in part, the responsibility to protect the safety and soundness of
individual institutions and the stability of the industry as a whole. But
they have tended to defer to industry in their day-to-day practices
when safety and soundness or stability is not at issue. So, some
skepticism might be in order in connection with US regulators playing
the same convening role that European regulators did so successfully
in the case of smart cards.
One feature of the situation holds out some hope for action in this
area. Financial regulators can have acted successfully to ameliorate
collective action problems in the area of information security. As we
have seen, their regulatory "nudge" moved the industry beyond single
51 See CAPGEMINI & ABN AMRO, WORLD PAYMENTS REPORT 2006 26 (2006).
52 Robin Arnfield, Here Comes EMV, CREDIT CARD MGMT., Jan. 3, 2005,
http://search.proquest.com/docview/201146993/fulltextPDF/13207C6F31o6664o614/1?a
ccountid= 9783. The Visa chip mandate schedule is part of its International Operating
Regulations. See VISA, VISA INTERNATIONAL OPERATING REGULATIONS SUMMARY OF
CHANGES (2011), available at http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/visa-
international-operating-regulations-summary.pdf.
53 See Shift of Liability for Fraudulent Transactions, CHIP AND PIN, available at
http://ww w.chipandpin.co.uk/business/card payments/means/shift liability.html (last
visited Feb. 29, 2012).
54 State ofSEPA Migration, supra note 49, at 15.
s Progress Report, supra note 50, at 10.
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factor authentication. It is true that they would have to be more
affirmative in their direction to the industry in the case of smart card
introduction in the U.S. They would not simply be able to say that the
static authentication embodied in magnetic stripe cards and terminal
readers was unacceptable. They would have to affirmatively take steps
to encourage the industry adoption of the dynamic authentication
embodied in smartcards. The industry might not be resistant to that
as has been indicated by recent statements from industry leaders. The
institutional blockage is less whether the new technology is effective
and worth it for the industry as a whole. The real obstacle appears to
be appropriate sharing of the costs and benefits of the transition. With
good will and cooperation from all parts of the industry, regulators
might very well be able to assist the transition to a higher and more
efficient level of security.
III. PART THREE
A. LESSONS LEARNED
In this section, I sum up some of the lessons that can be learned
from the examples just described. The overall theme is that no one
way of government interaction with the private sector is the one,
exclusive right way to do things. It depends on the nature of the
objective to be achieved and the obstacles that have to be overcome.
Another overall theme is the need to be clear about the goal to be
aimed at through combined industry-government action. At what level
of security are we aiming? It is a commonplace that perfect security is
a chimera. So what is the goal?
It might seem that a good starting point is that the right level and
type of security investment by the financial sector is the level and
direction for which a business case can be made by each financial
institution looking at the costs and benefits to it. Independent actors
assess the situation, and the aggregate result of these assessments
filtered through the normal market forces will produce the best level
of security.
But this is wrong for two reasons. First, the financial services
world is an interconnected system. Vulnerabilities at one point affect
other nodes in the system. This creates interdependency between the
decisions that one party makes and the consequences for other
parties. It might not be worth it to one party to make investments in
security because the consequences of not making those investments
fall on other parties. Second, existing liability rules, either contractual
or legal, interact with these system vulnerabilities in ways that can
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predictably generate underinvestment in security. Some participants
have a classic free-rider incentive to under-invest in security because
part of the benefit of their investment will accrue to others. This leads
to underinvestment in security compared to what would be socially
optimal. The notion of underinvestment here is not based on
government substituting its judgment of the right level of security for
the judgment of the private sector. The notion is the standard cost-
benefit concept that the sum of the welfare of the parties affected
would be higher if the amount of investment was higher or its
direction was different.
So the goal is to make sure that the industry achieves this efficient
level of security investment, taking into account the existence of
misaligned financial incentives and security externalities that prevent
individual business calculations from automatically producing this
result. 56 J turn now to the lessons learned.
A. LIABILITY RULES AND REGULATORY RESPONSIBILITY
Government can have an extraordinarily powerful effect on the
nature and size of security investments through the establishment of
liability rules and regulatory responsibility. The example already
discussed that illustrates this theme is the decision by the U.S
Congress to limit the payment liability of cardholders for
unauthorized use of their cards.57 This decision to largely hold the
56 Something like this Kaldor-Hicks principle is espoused in the "Greatest Good" principle
included in the cyberspace proposal adopted by a coalition of business groups and civil
liberties groups. See Bus. SOFrWARE ALLIANCE ET AL., IMPROVING OUR NATION'S
CYBERSECURITY THROUGH THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP: A WHITE PAPER 7 (2011),
available at http://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/201103o8-cbyersec paper.pdf.
57 Banking regulators can shift liability in order to provide an incentive to control fraud to
the party best positioned to take effective steps to achieve that goal. For instance, in 2005,
in response to concerns about unauthorized remotely created checks, which are created by
the payee and do not bear the account holder's signature, the Federal Reserve Board
assigned liability for losses associated with unauthorized remotely created checks to the
depositary bank that works with the payee. The idea was that in the absence of a signature
the account holder's bank would have no way of knowing whether the check was legitimate.
However, the depositary bank could monitor its customers to ensure that there were good
business practices and could detect problems through monitoring the extent of returned
items. The Board concluded that by shifting the liability for fraudulent remotely created
checks it would "create an economic incentive for depository banks to perform the
requisite due diligence on their [remotely created check] customers." See Collection of
Checks and Other Items by Federal Reserve Banks and Funds Transfers Through Fedwire
and Availability of Funds and Collections of Checks, 70 Fed. Reg. 10509 at 10510,
(proposed Mar. 4, 2005) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 210, 229).
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cardholders harmless meant that the costs of unauthorized use of
payment cards fell on the financial institutions that issued the cards
and the payment systems that processed the transactions. This
financial impact drove the payment systems forward on a search for
ways to minimize fraud losses from unauthorized use. Digitizing the
transaction records had speed and efficiency factors that motivated its
introduction, but it also enabled the use of computer and software
mechanisms to control fraud. Two examples of these security
measures were the use of card security codes embedded on the
magnetic stripe and on the face or back of the cards themselves, and
the use of neural networks to detect unusual patters of card usage. As
a result, fraud levels in the payment card world have experienced a
long-term secular decline since the 1990s. This decline has stopped
and fraud rates in the industry have stabilized at about six cents for
every oo dollars worth of transactions.58
This decision to immunize cardholders from liability incentivized
the financial system to take the necessary steps to improve security
over time. The objective was not static, but was dynamic. The aim was
not to get the highest level of security using whatever system
architecture and safety precautions existed at the time. At the time the
liability legislation was passed, the payment system was entirely paper
and fraud was substantially higher than it is today. The immunity
provision worked to upgrade the entire system.
The key lesson that policy makers can learn from this example is
to pay attention to which party in the system has the ability to make
system improvements to provide a higher level of security. In some
circumstances, the ability to innovate to provide improvements rests
at the edges of complex systems. One of the reasons the Internet has
been so successful as an engine of innovation is that it distributes the
ability to innovate to the edges of its networks, rather than
centralizing this ability in the hands of the network operators. But not
all systems have this end-to-end architecture. Financial systems in
general and payment systems in particular tend to be centralized with
decisions on system upgrades and changes in architecture made by
the major industry players and network operators. Individuals at the
edges of the system have almost no ability to bring about systemic
changes, and therefore no ability to innovate to improve the level of
security in the system.
One could argue, and many in the industry did argue, that
individual responsibility for unauthorized use would provide an
s8 Press Release, Visa, supra note 15.
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incentive to the cardholders to be careful with their payment cards.
But this might at best help to control lost and stolen fraud, which was
not and is not the major category of fraud loss. For counterfeit fraud,
which is a major category, there is nothing individuals can do to
reduce losses. When a hacker breaks into a merchant database and
obtains millions of card account numbers, there is no basis for
thinking that any level of individual cardholder diligence can prevent
these cards from subsequently being used for fraudulent purposes.
This pattern of thinking should apply to current allocations of
responsibility for providing reasonable levels of security. The thinking
behind the PCI DSS and the use of this standard as an enforcement
standard is based on the idea that the merchant or processor has the
capacity to control information at their own site. But that is a static
perception of the situation. There is a security vulnerability when the
payment systems distribute key cardholder authentication
information to the millions of merchants, processors and financial
institutions in the system and then expect them all to provide the
highest levels of security to prevent hackers from getting access to this
valuable information. An architectural change that devalues this
authentication information is clearly the most desirable solution.
There is nothing, however, that the merchants and processors can
do on their own at the edges of the system to improve the architecture.
A movement to chip and PIN for example is not something they can
just voluntarily adopt. It has to be something done by the financial
institutions and network operators who control the payment system
architecture. As we have seen in the example of the European
movement to smart card technology, all players in that system need to
be involved in making the upgrade, and allocation of liability can be a
useful tool to manage the transition.
A. REGULATION AND LEGISLATION
The lesson to be learned from our examples in the area of
regulation and legislation is that these tools of government should be
at the level of principles, with implementation left flexibly to the
interaction of industry and government agencies. Government
involvement is counterproductive when it locks specific security
practices into law or regulation. In this regard, legislation such as
Gramm-Leach-Bliley, which requires firms to establish appropriate
processes to focus attention and resources on information security, is
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appropriate.59 Also appropriate would be requirements for reasonable
security measures. 60
The enforcement of a reasonable security requirement presents
complex difficulties. Individuals and institutions could enforce the
security requirements themselves through court actions. A private
right of action might seem efficient since it distributes the
enforcement burden from government agencies with limited resources
to private parties who might have been harmed by security
vulnerabilities. But this is a recipe for endless delay and even abuse. It
ultimately means that courts will be determining what security
practices are reasonable. While it is reasonable to expect that a
regulatory agency assigned the task of enforcing security standards
would develop some understanding of security issues, it is very
unlikely that courts would be able to develop this expertise.
The best course of action for the enforcement of a reasonable
security requirement would be at a national regulatory agency. In the
financial sector, this means the functional financial services regulators
for traditional financial institutions and the FTC for non-traditional
financial institutions. The financial regulators are able to effectively
carry out this responsibility as part of their ongoing examination
responsibility. The FTC relies on complaints and orders to make sure
that their rules are well understood and widely known. The recent
financial services reform legislation did not disturb this allocation of
responsibilities for security regulation in the financial services
sector. 61
A. CONVENER ROLE
59 See 15 U.S.C. § 68o(b).
60 Press Release, U.S. Senator John Kerry, Kerry, McCain Introduce Commercial Privacy:
Bi-Partisan Legislation Would Enhance Protection and Control of Personal Information
(Apr. 12, 2011), available at http://kerry.senate.gov/press/release/?id=59a56001-5430-
4b6d-b476-46oo4odeO27b. The draft privacy legislation from Senator Kerry calls for the
Federal Trade Commission to establish and enforce such reasonable security requirements.
Previous privacy legislation and data breach notification legislation contained similar
reasonable security requirements.
61 Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act H.R. 4173, as enrolled and passed by
Congress (Pub. L.111-203). Title X establishes a new Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau, which is given the responsibility for privacy regulation in the financial services
sector. Responsibility for security, however, stays with the traditional financial service
regulators and the FTC.
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Government has a key role in identifying and eliminating
coordination difficulties that prevent autonomous industry action.
This can often be done by bringing the parties together to move them
toward common action despite institutional blockages and misaligned
financial incentives that impede this action. In the current case, these
institutional roadblocks will be less about the efficient level of security
investments and more about the allocation of costs and benefits
associated with moving to a higher level of security.
The European transition to smart cards illustrates this role. In the
United States there is an opportunity for public private partnerships
to play a similar role. The industry seems to have converged on the
idea of chip cards as a new architecture that will have substantial
advantages. It is no longer a question of whether, but of when. 62 Visa
has announced, for example, that it will provide some relief from
compliance with PCI standards for merchants who have implemented
chip and PIN. Unfortunately, because of regulations regarding
interchange on debit cards, they have not moved to extend this trade-
off to merchants in the United States. 63
Government involvement in this transition would be helpful. The
major issue is not whether this would be an improvement. Studies
indicate that chip would have a payback period of approximately five
years in terms of fraud reduction. But it is expensive to implement,
approximately $13 billion. Each party in the system has to make
upgrades in order for the system to accommodate chip cards. But each
party does not benefit the same from the upgrades. Merchants and
processors have to make the most substantial investments, but the
financial institutions that issue cards would benefit the most. 64
In this context, a government role to help allocate costs would be
sensible.65 Regulators are already heavily involved in the setting of
interchange rates for debit cards. These interchange rates would be
62 See Richey, supra note 15.
63 Press Release, Visa, supra note 15.
64 Card Industry Has a Compelling Case for Data Encryption, Report Says,
BRIGHTERION.COM (Jan. 13, 2010),
http://www.brighterion.com/PDFArticles/CardlndustryHasaCompellingCaseforDataEncr
yption.pdf.
65 A cost allocation role associated with a government mandate is typical. See, for example,
the British Government's decision to require ISPs to pay only 25% of the costs of its
mandated graduated response law to control online copyright infringement. Digital
Economy Act, 2010, C.24, § 15 (U.K.).
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one possible way that the system could redistribute costs associated
with upgrading the system. The card networks have used an
interchange shift to provide an incentive to move to chip in other
jurisdictions. 66 With appropriate non-regulatory encouragement from
the government, a similar incentive interchange structure could
provide reasonable cost sharing that could motivate all parties to
make the transition.
Existing institutions can mediate these conversations. The FS-
ISAC67 is one such entity. It has wide industry membership including
American Express, Bank of America, Citigroup, Fannie Mae, Morgan
Stanley, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase, PayPal, and Wells Fargo
and participation from government entities as well including The
Federal Reserve and Federal Reserve Bank of New York. It gathers
information about cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities from
various sources and distributes it back to its member organizations. It
also provides recommended solutions from industry experts.
The U.S. Department of the Treasury, the Office of the
Comptroller of Currency, the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), the United States Secret Service, and the Financial Services
Sector Coordinating Council recommend FS-ISAC membership. In
fact, both Treasury and DHS rely on the FS-ISAC to disseminate
critical information to the financial services sector in times of crisis.
Another useful intermediary organization for public-private
cooperation in this area is the Financial Industry Sector Coordinating
Council. 68 The Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council for
Critical Infrastructure Protection and Homeland Security (FSSCC),
established in 2002, is the sector coordinator for Financial Services
66 Vidyalaxmi & Preeti R lyer, Visa, MasterCard Want Banks to Pursue EMV Technology,
Bus. STANDARD (Jan. 17, 2006), http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/visa-
mastercard-want-banks-to-pursue-emy-technology/234665. For MasterCard's interchange
shift, see Regional Liability Shift Policies, MASTERCARD ONLINE,
https://mol.mastercard.net/mol/molbe/public/login/ebusiness/smart cards/one-smart
card/chip-migration strategy/liability shift.jsp (last visited Feb. 29, 2012).
67 See FIN. SERV. INFO. SHARING AND ANALYSIS CTR., http://wkwx-.fsisac.com (last visited
Feb. 29, 2012) (stating that the Financial Service Information Sharing and Analysis Center
is an "industry forum for collaboration on critical security threats facing the financial
services sector.").
68 See FIN. SERVS. SECTOR COORDINATING COUNCIL, https://www.fsscc.org/fsscc (last
visited Feb. 29, 2012) (stating that FISCC is a "group of more than 30 private-sector firms
and financial trade associations that works to help reinforce the financial services sector's




for the protection of critical infrastructure, focused on operational
risks. Because the FSSCC fits into a larger network of industry/sector
coordinating councils, it is uniquely positioned as the leader within
financial services for developing strategies to improve shared critical
infrastructure and homeland security.
The FSSCC's mission is further supported by Homeland Security
Presidential Directive #7, which directs government agencies to
identify and protect critical infrastructure. The FSSCC works closely
with the Treasury as its designated Sector Specific Agency (SSA),
establishing a strong public-private partnership to maintain a robust
sector that is resilient against manmade or natural incidents.
Members commit their time and resources to FSSCC with a sense of
responsibility to their individual firms and for the benefit of
consumers and the country's populace.
These groups meet regularly to exchange best practices and
information regarding security threats and have an extensive network
of contacts with government agencies already developed. They provide
a good example of public-private partnerships to address these issues.
Their membership, however, is limited to financial service companies
or trade associations, and would need to be expanded significantly to
provide the right mix of parties.
The industry associations that are involved in information security
provide a useful model as well. PCI SCC is heavily involved in the
development of information security standards and has access to
substantial expertise to evaluate new technologies. 69 BITS is also an
organization that could aggregate and organize industry expertise.70
The missing piece for these organizations is explicit involvement from
government.
A. RANGE OF GOVERNMENT ROLES
The most important lesson is for policy makers to examine the
entire range of possible involvement and pick the right tool for the
69 Press Release, PCI Security Standards Council, PCI SCC Collaborates with a Variety of
Stakeholders in Determining When to Upgrade PCI DSS (Nov. 16, 2009).
70See BITS, http://ww w.bitsinfo.org (last visited Jan. 29, 2012). BITS is an industry
consortium made up of loo of the largest financial institutions in the US and associated
with the Financial Services Roundtable. It "provides intellectual capital and fosters
collaboration to address emerging issues where financial services, technology, and
commerce intersect." Id.
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right job. The legitimate government role lies along a range from low
to high involvement:
* Industry autonomously evolves security
standards;
* An enforcement role putting the weight of
government behind industry-developed and
upgraded standards;
* More active phase where government agencies
conclude that current industry practices are
inadequate and must be improved but does not
mandate or promote any particular solution;
and
* A still more active phase where government
actively encourages industry to adopt a
particular security approach.
When industry is beginning to develop a solution to a problem, the
first stage of industry autonomy might be the most appropriate. This
is what happened as the payment card industry began to develop the
PCI DSS. It was first perceived as an industry problem. The existing
financial incentives were inadequate to encourage merchants to
safeguard cardholder information and so the industry began to
develop a non-regulatory, private standard, to be enforced through the
web of contracts that knits the payment systems together.
When enforcement of these standards purely by industry efforts
seemed to be flagging, the government role properly shifted to one of
bringing to bear government sanctions against entities that did not
comply with the standard. The mechanism chosen was not lawsuits by
private parties, but rather enforcement action by a regulatory agency,
the Federal Trade Commission. Once the industry had developed the
security standard, the regulatory agency could view the standard as a
measure of what was reasonable for companies to provide. No one
could expect the regulatory agency to have the expertise to create or
require upgrades to the standard, but they could reasonably defer to
the industry standard as a standard of due care. And over time, they
could develop an expertise in understanding how the standard was
interpreted, validated and enforced.
A more active stage can be reached when the industry seems stuck
in a level of security activity that fails to take advantage of clear, well-
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understood security steps that would pass a cost-benefit test if they
could be implemented. This took place in the case of the federal
regulators' reactions to the phishing problem for online banking. A
collective action problem prevented each financial institution from
moving on its own, but with the decision that the status quo of
password-based single factor authentication represented inadequate
levels of security, the industry could move collectively to a higher
stage of security. Notice at this stage, however, the government did
not mandate or nudge the industry toward any particular technology
as the solution.
A final stage takes place when a new system architecture or
security solution appears to have well-documented advantages, but
industry players are not moving or cannot move toward that solution.
The government role here is to act as a convener to overcome
institutional obstacles. The movement to chip in the European Union
illustrates this role. In the United States, a similar role would makes
sense to overcome the distributional concerns that appear to be
blocking the move to chip technology, despite a general understanding
that this would represent a cost effective solution if the industry could
get there.
It is possible for government to go beyond that by mandating
specific security measures as a matter of law or regulation. In general,
however, the government should refrain from enshrining specific
security measures in law or regulation, since this can freeze
innovation, lock in less effective security measures and prevent the
development of compensating controls that are less costly and equally
effective.
IV. CONCLUSION
The key role for government is to keep an eye on the system and
not on any of the individual participants. Its aim is not to encourage
more security for the sake of more security, but to make sure that
desirable upgrades, improvements and innovations are made.
It is important to emphasize that this notion of desirable upgrade
that should be the basis for government involvement is not that
security is good and more security is better. There is a limit to what
needs to be spent on security. If too much is spent on security, then
the consequences for people will be negative. We will lose value in our
financial services and products when we pay more for security than
can be recovered in reduced costs.
There is a wider issue here, however, which should be mentioned,
even though I do not have much to contribute to its solution.
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Sometimes the damage that can be done through vulnerabilities in the
financial services sector falls on organizations and institutions outside
the sector. Disruptions of the financial system or the payment system
can affect people in all aspects of their lives and lead to delays and
shortages in other parts of the economy. Gains from stolen payment
card information can be appropriated by terrorist organizations and
used to inflict physical damage and other harms on other sectors.
These external effects are beyond the capacity of financial services
regulators and the financial industry to address on their own. There
might be a need to move the industry to a higher level of security to
compensate for these extra-systemic effects. This needs to involve
wider coordination with larger industry and governmental groups.
The coordination efforts described at the beginning of this article by
the FSSCC are part of this wider government-industry effort. The
Administration's expected cybersecurity proposal might provide
direction in how to move in this direction.
It is possible that government policymakers and other industry
officials think that extra security needs to be provided in the financial
services sector beyond what would be justified by an analysis of the
internal costs of security flaws to industry participants. If so there
might need to be a government role to provide an incentive for the
financial sector to make these additional expenditures.71
This paper has identified a range of roles for government to play to
promote socially beneficial security measures in the financial services
sector. They each have their advantages in particular contexts. The
choice should be made depending on the details of the particular
situation, rather than on some overarching conception of the right role
for government to play. Cooperation and coordination are the good
words in this context. With these flexible ideals as our guide, industry
and government can together move the industry toward a higher and
more socially beneficial level of security.
71 See Bus. Software Alliance et al., supra note 56, at 7.
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